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The New Constitutional Courts: Albania

THE TRIBUNAL

IN TIRANA

ByJohn Pauljones
As amended periodically, The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions of April29, 1991 (No. 7491) serves the
Republic of Albania as a temporary constitution. The
final constitution, which is currently being prepared by
the Special Constitutional Commission, must be ratified
by the People's Assembly to take effect. When the Law
on Major Constitutional Provisions was enacted more
than two years ago, it was intended by the People's Assembly to remain in force for less than a year. It is still in
service, however, the Special Constitutional Commission
having proven incapable thus far of drafting a suitable
replacement.
In its original form, the Law on Major Constitutional
Provisions said little about an Albanian judiciary and nothing about its role in constitutional enforcement. Article 2
declared that the state was based on the rule of law and
had the duty of respecting, inter alia, the constitutional
order as well as human dignity, rights, freedoms, and
equality under law. Article 3 identified the separation of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers as the fundamental principle of state organization. Article 5 noted
that judicial power would be exercised by courts that are
independent and guided solely by law. While the organs
and operations of legislative and executive powers were
described in substantial detail, those of the judicial power
were not described at all. Almost as an afterthought,
Article 42left the establishment of courts to existing law.
After the bloodless revolution of March 1992, a new
People's Assembly moved to correct this oversight, passing some amendments and additions to the April 1991
law, precisely one year later. Together, these April1992
amendments added a new chapter to Albania's provisional constitution entitled "The Organization ofJustice

and the Constitutional Court." Part I of the amendment
established a judicial system comprised of a Court of Cassation, an appellate court, courts of first instance, and
military courts. Part II of the amendment established a
Constitutional Court. Both the text and the structure of
the amendment reveal the legislature's antipathy towards
a unified judicial system of constitutional review. Explicitly described as the "highestjudicial authority," the Court
of Cassation enjoys appellate power to review for errors
of law-except when the asserted error is lack of conformity of a normative act with the provisional constitution.
Errors of that sort lie within the exclusive purview of the
Constitutional Court. According to Article 24, the Constitutional Court has these competencies:
1. It makes interpretations of the constitution and
constitutional laws.
2. It judges whether laws and acts that have the force
oflaw are compatible with the constitution and with
the law.
3. Itjudges whether acts and regulatory provisions are
compatible with the constitution and with the law.
4. It decides on the compatibility with the constitution of international agreements concluded in the
name of the Republic of Albania before their ratification, as well as on the compliance of the laws with
generally accepted norms of international law and
with agreements to which the Republic of Albania is
a party.
5. It resolves disagreements of competency between
the executive, legislative, and judicial powers as well
as those between local authorities and the central
power.
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6. It decides questions connected with the constitutionality of parties and other political and social organizations and can prohibit their activity.
7. It resolves questions on the legality of the election
of the President of the Republic, deputies, and also
popular referenda, promulgating the conclusive results.
8. It investigates penal accusations raised against the
President of the Republic.
9. It resolves conclusively complaints of persons presented by way of constitutional control for violation
of their basic rights by illegal acts.
10. It decides on the suspension of the implementation of a law when it observes that it is not compatible
with the constitution, and on the suspension or repeal
of acts and other provisions when it observes that
they are not compatible with the constitution or with
law, as well as taking measures that it deems appropriate for the question it is adjudicating.

According to Article 25, the court may itself initiate
constitutional review. The President of the Republic, a
parliamentary group, one fifth of the Deputies, the Council of Ministers, judges and local government organs may
also trigger review by the court, as may any person claiming violation of his or her constitutional rights or freedoms.
According to Article 26, decisions of the Constitutional Court must be reasoned. They must be reached by
majority vote. Judges of the court acknowledge that there
have been disagreements about the resolution of one or
more of the first eight cases, but no dissenting opinions
have yet been made public. Despite the fact that Article
26 specifically authorizes a dissentingjudge to attach to
the court's decision a dissenting opinion, the ChiefJudge
has so far declined to release dissents for publication in
the Official Notebook, which has been the exclusive
source for decisions. As an example of the court's product, Decision Number 8, the most recently reported, is
described below.

Albanian Constitutional Court Decision #8
In Decision No. 8, the Tirana District Court and the
Prosecutor General both challenged The Law on Weatr
ons of May 25, 1992 (No. 7566). The law permitted
police to enter residences and search for unlicensed fire-
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arms without prior authorization from the district prosecutor, and directed that persons apprehended on suspicion of possessing unlicensed firearms be held in custody
for the duration of the investigation and trial.
The Constitutional Court found that the Prosecutor
General lacked standing to bring such a challenge, but
found itself empowered to consider sua sponte the proposition that the Law on Weapons conflicted with Article 2
of the Law on Major Constitutional Provisions as
amended by Article 1 of the Law of April29, 1992. In
other words, the Constitutional Court found itself competent to consider on its own motion the proposition that
a statute empowering police to search persons and places
without the approval of the prosecutor violated the fundamental tenet of judicial independence and the fundamental right of persons to be free from arbitrary search
and seizure.
According to the Constitutional Court, searches without prior prosecutorial authorization could be proper only
in exceptional, that is urgent and flagrant, cases and only
then if specifically provided for in the relevant penal statute. These limitations, along with the requirement that
post hoc approval be obtained from the district prosecutor
within twelve hours of the search, were deemed by the
Court to be essential aspects of the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by Article 2 of the
provisional constitution.
When the Court turned to the constitutionality of
custodial detention of a suspect during the entire investigation and trial, however, it applied the principle ofjudicial autonomy articulated in Article 1 of the 1992 amendment, rather than an individual right discernible in Article 2 of the Law on Major Constitutional Provisions.
The court found that the decision to detain a suspect in
custody was dependent on the particular circumstances
of the case, including the type of offense, the weight of
evidence, the health of the accused, as well as the likelihood of flight, interference with the investigation, or continued wrongdoing. The analysis of such factors was a
peculiarly judicial function, concluded the court, and its
assignment to the police in cases governed by the Law on
Weapons therefore constituted a breach of the constitutional imperative of separation of powers.
In light of the Albanian perception of the district
prosecutor as a judicial officer, it is not clear why the
Constitutional Court correlated the two issues and the
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two principles in this fashion. Both issues may be seen as
conflicts between executive power, as exercised by police, and judicial power, as exercised by judicial officers
such as the district prosecutor and the trial judge. When
police search without a prosecutor's approval, they usurp
judicial prerogative just as much as when they detain a
suspect in custody without a judge's approval. By the
same token, if, in Albania, a person's constitutional rights
include freedom from most warrantless searches, it is hard
to imagine that they do not include as well freedom from
confinement without the approval of a neutral and detached magistrate. In Article 4 of its provisional constitution, the Republic of Albania guarantees individual human rights accepted by international conventions. Just
such a right can be found in Article 9, Section 3 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
in Article 5, Section 3 of the European Convention of
Human Rights. The Republic of Albania has pledged its
conformity to both of these conventions.
Having found two provisions of the Law on Weapons incompatible with the Law on Major Constitutional
Provisions, the Constitutional Court then proceeded to
amend the former by judicial fiat. The court rewrote the
first sentence of Article 14.4 of the Law on Weapons so
that searches without prior prosecutorial approval would
only be permitted in the limited conditions which the
court had previously found constitutionally acceptable.
The court merely declared the second sentence (permitting detention untiljudgment) invalid.
The Constitutional Court's twin holdings that
Albania's provisional constitution prohibits both most
warrantless searches and all pre-trial detention without a
magistrate's approval ought to seem unexceptional to most
Anglo-American observers. These holdings mesh with
both our own constitutional traditions and an emerging
Western consensus. On the other hand, the court's next
step, rewriting a statute by court order, might raise an
eyebrow or two, especially when it occurs so proximately
to the court's reaffirmation of the sacrosanct nature of
separation of powers. If, as this decision makes clear, the
executive has no business makingjudicial decisions, what
business has the court rewriting legislative acts?
The offense is more formal than substantial, however. American courts accomplish much the same result;
they just do it with less forthrightness. Tools for a voiding

at least the appearance of conflict at the boundary between judicial and legislative power abound in systems
based upon separation of powers. Perhaps the most illustrative example is the United States Supreme Court's
revision of the draft law for conscientious objectors in
United States v. Seegar. The Selective Service and Training
Act of 1940 had excused from compulsory military service those who by "religious training and belief" opposed
all wars. When a new draft law was enacted in 1948,
Congress narrowed the religious training and belief prerequisite to conscientious objection to "belief in relation
to a Supreme Being" and not "essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code." In Seegar, the Court nevertheless held that the
quoted language also provided for exemption of one who
did not entertain any such belief in a Supreme Being.
Unlike the Constitutional Court of Albania, the United
States Supreme Court did not dictate an amendment to
the statute before it, but its transparently manipulative
interpretation amounted to the same thing.
Borrowing from Seegar, the Albanian Constitutional
Court could have accomplished the same ends in Decision No.8 without so openly usurping legislative power.
To the first offending sentence, for example, the Court
might have applied the useful presumption that a legislature intends to legislate only that which would comply
with the constitution. Assuming that the presumption
could not have been rebutted in this instance (by, for
example, ill-considered if candid declarations during floor
debate of an intent by the People's Assembly to defy the
basic law), it could have led the court to conclude that the
legislature intended to confer on police as extensive a
power to search for weapons as the constitution would
suffer. Then the Constitutional Court could have found
that the Law on Weapons really authorized police
searches only under the conditions the Court derived
from Article 2 of the Law on Major Constitutional Provisions. The result would have been a judicial decision
upholding a legislative act, or at least presenting the appearance of doing so.

John Paul Jones is a Prqfossor at the University of Richmond
Law School The author is indebted to Kathleen Imholz, Esq., of
Mishkin, Kohler & Imholz in New York for very careful translations.
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